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1. Introduction. Since the introduction of the notion of a cooperative game in char- 
acteristic function form in Von Neumann and Morgenstern [30], many solutions for 
these games have been proposed. In the context of cooperative games in characteristic 
function form, the solution aims at describing one or more equitable divisions of the 
total savings among the participants in the game (or, equivalently, fair allocations of the 
total cost to the users in a joint project). The core is one of the very first proposed "set" 
solutions and was introduced and named in game theory in Gillies [11], although the 
idea of the core was already foreshadowed by the Tennessee Valley Authority cost allo- 
cation treatment in Ransmeier [22]. Shapley [24] produced an important "one-point" 
solution, the so-called Shapley value. Moreover, we mention the set solution concept of 
the prekernel and the one-point solution concept of the prenucleolus. 
The mathematical approach to a proposed solution is to examine a number of its 
(elementary) properties and, if possible, to provide a minimal number of properties 
which fully characterize the solution. Shapley [24] listed three properties in his charac- 
terization of the Shapley value on the class of games with a fixed player set. The main 
purpose of this paper is to review the characterizations ofthe Shapley value, the prekernel, 
the prenucleolus, and the core, on the class of (almost) all games by means of a consistency 
property. Generally speaking, the formulation of the consistency property for a solution 
is in terms of the solution itself and the so-called reduced games. This paper reviews the 
use of reduced games throughout he literature on cooperative games in characteristic 
function form. Informally, the notion of a reduced game can be elucidated as follows. 
A cooperative game is always described by a finite player set as well as a real-valued 
"characteristic function" on the collection of subsets of the player set. A so-called reduced 
game is deducible from a given cooperative game by removing one or more players on 
the understanding that the removed players will be paid according to a specific principle 
(e.g., a proposed payoff vector). The remaining players form the player set of the reduced 
game; the characteristic function of which is composed of the original characteristic 
function, the proposed payoff vector, and/or the solution in question. The consistency 
property for the solution states that if all the players are supposed to be paid according 
to a payoff vector in the solution set of the original game, then the players of the reduced 
game can achieve the corresponding payoff vector in the solution set of the reduced game. 
In other words, there is no inconsistency in what the players of the reduced game can 
achieve, in either the original game or the reduced game. 
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We advance three motives for the study of the consistency property in the field of 
cooperative game theory. First, a distinction between game theoretic solutions can be 
made by distinguishing between the corresponding consistency properties. Second, the 
consistency property for a fixed solution may be of importance for the development of 
the theory of that solution. Third, the consistency property in the game theoretic frame- 
work may be useful in order to determine the "consistent" solution of a realistic problem 
(see ? 6 for an application). 
In ? 2 we bring the framework of cooperative game theory to the forefront and 
discuss the properties which will be used in the axiomatizations of the solutions as pre- 
sented in the next sections. In ? 3 we review the axiomatic characterization of the Shapley 
value by means of a consistency property due to Hart and Mas-Colell (Theorem 3.1 ) 
and due to Sobolev (Theorem 3.2). Section 4 considers characterization of the prekernel 
due to Peleg (Theorem 4.1 ) and of the prenucleolus due to Sobolev (Theorem 4.2), 
while the axiomatization of the core of balanced and totally balanced games due to Peleg 
(Theorems 5.1 and 5.2) is reviewed in ? 5. In summary, this paper unifies six related 
theorems that are scattered throughout he literature on mathematics. Whenever new 
proofs of the existence or uniqueness part of the axiomatizations can be given, they are 
also included. An additional purpose of this paper is to prove the uniqueness parts of 
Theorems 3.1, 3.2, and 4.2 by means of a single line of argument. In other cases, we 
refer to the proofs in the original papers. 
2. Properties for solutions of cooperative games. The mathematical model of a 
cooperative game in characteristic function form is described by a finite nonempty set N 
and a real-valued function v on the family 2 N of subsets of the player set N, satisfying 
v( 0 ): = 0. We refer to a nonempty subset S of N as a coalition and to v(S) as the worth 
of coalition S. The function v itself is called the characteristic function of the game 
(N, v). The set of games with player set N is denoted by GN, while G denotes the class 
of all games. 
Suppose the grand coalition N is formed, then the players must divide the total 
earnings v(N) of the grand coalition. A payoff vector for the player set N is a real-valued 
function x on N, denoted by x E p N. Here x( i), which is usually denoted by xi, represents 
the payoff to player iE N according to x E P N. A payoff vector that distributes the amount 
v(N) among the players is said to be Pareto-optimal (or efficient). A Pareto-optimal 
payoff vector is also called a pre-imputation and the set of pre-imputations for a game 
(N, v) is denoted by I*(N, v). Thus, 
I* (N v):= XEpN E x = v(N)} 
For the sake of convenience, if xE pN and S c N, then we write x(S) instead of 
>JESxj, where x(0) := 0. 
A solution is a function a which associates with any game (N, v) a subset U(N, v) 
of its pre-imputation set I* (N, v). Note that the solution set c(N, v) is allowed to be 
empty. A solution a is called a value if for any game (N, v) the corresponding solution 
set u(N, v) is a singleton. 
Given any game (N, v), any coalition T c N, and any payoff vector x E pN, there 
are various ways to define a reduced game ( T, vX) with respect to x, which is given in 
terms of the original characteristic function v and the payoff vector x. Note that the 
player set T of the reduced game is obtained here by removing the nonmembers of T 
from the original player set N. The reduced game (T, vX) should describe the following 
situation. Suppose that all the players in N agree that the nonmembers of Twill be paid 
This content downloaded from 130.89.45.231 on Thu, 17 Dec 2015 08:41:44 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
CONSISTENCY PROPERTIES IN COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY 45 
according to a specific principle (e.g., the payoff vector x). Moreover, suppose that the 
nonmembers of T continue to cooperate with the members of T. Then the worth vx(S) 
of coalition S c T in the reduced game represents the total savings that the members of 
S may achieve subject to the foregoing two suppositions. 
A solution a is said to possess the reduced game property (RGP) (with respect to a 
specified type of reduced games) whenever the next condition is satisfied: 
RGP. If (N, v) is a game, 0 # T c N and x E u(N, v), then xTE o(T, vX). xT E 
T denotes the restriction of x E pN to T c N. Here the reduced game property says that 
if a payoff vector x is a point in the solution set u(N, v) of the original game (N, v) 
(according to the solution a ), then the restriction XTofX to any coalition T c N belongs 
to the solution set ( T, vX) of the corresponding reduced game (T, vX) (according to 
the solution a). 
In case the solution is a value, the reduced game condition requires that if the players 
are supposed to be paid according to the value, then there is no inconsistency in what 
the players of the reduced game will get, in either the original game or the reduced game. 
Thus, the RGP can be seen as a property of consistency. 
The first version of a reduced game and the corresponding RGP can be found in 
Davis and Maschler [ 6 ]. A systematic study of RGP is presented in Aumann and Dreze 
[1]. However, their study refers to solutions of games with coalition structures (i.e., 
partitions of the player set). Usually, solutions of games are defined with reference to 
the all-player coalition and not with reference to an arbitrary coalition structure. Here 
we consider the usual treatment of solutions. The core consists of pre-imputations that 
cannot be improved upon by any coalition. That is, the core of a game (N, v) is defined 
to be 
C(N, v) := {xEI* (N, v) I x(S) v(S) for all ScN}l. 
The familiar formula for the Shapley value 4(N, v) E pN of a game (N, v) is as follows 
(Shapley [ 24]): for all i E N 
(2.1) 4),(N, v)= E YN(S) [V(SU {i )V(S)], 
ScN- {i} 
where 
(2.2) 'YN(S):= (INIJ!)-I S!(INI -I SI-1 )! for all Sc N, S# N. 
Here I A I denotes the number of elements in the finite set A. Note that 
ISc N- {} -YN(S) = 1 for all i E N. We also mention an alternative formula for the 
Shapley value due to Driessen [7], [9]. The Shapley value 4(N, v) E PN of a game 
(N, v) is equal to 
(2.3) 4i(N,v)= 'YN(S)[V(N-S)-v(S)] foralliEN. 
ScN- {i} 
We postpone the definitions of two other major solutions, the prekernel and the prenucle- 
olus. In the remainder of this section we list and discuss several elementary properties 
for solutions. In the next sections it will be shown that suitably chosen properties together 
with a consistency property in terms of the reduced games fully characterize a particular 
solution. We begin by listing the well-known nonemptiness and individual rationality 
properties for a solution a. 
NE. A solution a is said to possess the nonemptiness (NE) property if o(N, v) # 
0 for any game (N, v). 
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IR. A solution a is said to be individually rational (IR) if for any game (N, v), any 
xE U(N, v) and any iEN: x, _ v({i}). 
RISE. A solution a is said to be relatively invariant under strategic equivalence 
(RISE) whenever the next condition is satisfied: if (N, v) is a game with U(N, v) # 0, 
a > 0, and : E pN, then u(N, atv + 3) = au(N, v) + f. Here the game (N, atv + f) is 
given by (atv + :)(S) := av(S) + j-JES 3# for all S c N. 
The relative invariance under S-equivalence requires that the solution behave in a 
natural way with respect to changes in scale that are comparable with positive affine 
transformations. The following two properties refer to payoffs to "identical" players ac- 
cording to a point in the solution set. Two players are called substitutes if the worth of 
any coalition containing exactly one of the two players is not affected by interchanging 
the two players. That is, the players i, j E N, i # j, are substitutes in a game (N, v) if 
v(SU {i}) = v(SU {j})forallScN- {i,j}. 
SYM. A value a is said to be symmetric (SYM) whenever the next condition is 
satisfied: if (N, v) is a game, i E N, x = u(N, v) and H a permutation on N, then Ox = 
a(N, Ov). Here the game (N, Hv) and the payoff vector Ox E pNare given by (Ov)(OS):= 
v(S) for all S c Nand (Ox)(Hi) := x(i) for all i E N. 
ETP. A solution a is said to possess the equal treatment property (ETP) if for any 
substitutes i,jEN, i #j, in a game (N, v) and any x E u(N, v): xi = xJ. 
The symmetry requires that the value is not affected by a renumbering of the players, 
while the equal treatment property means that substitutes receive the same payoff by 
any point in the solution set. It is straightforward to verify that a symmetric value 
possesses ETP. 
Usually, NE, RISE, and ETP must be satisfied to conclude that the solution is stan- 
dard for two-person games. Here a solution a is called standardfor two-person games if 
for all games ({i, j}, v) with i #j 
J({i,j}, v) v({ i}) 2 [(f i,J}) - v({ i}) - j})], 
i.e., the "surplus" v( { i, j - v( { i} -v( { j}) is equally divided among the two players 
according to the solution. 
LEMMA 2.1. If a solution a satisfies NE, RISE, and ETP, then a is standard for 
two-person games. 
Proof. Let the solution a satisfy NE, RISE, and ETP and let (N, v) be a two-person 
game, where N = { i, j}, i j. Define the two-person game (N, w) by w(S) := v(S) - 
k-keS v( { k }) for all Sc N. Because the players i and j are substitutes in the game 
(N, w), we obtain that xi =X = Iw({i,j}) for any xE E(N, w) = a(N, v)- 
(v({i}), v({j})). As such, 
o1(N,v)=v({i})?+o(N,w)=v({i})?+ [v({i,j})-v({i})-v({j})]. DG 
Since SYM is a stronger equirement han ETP, it follows immediately from Lemma 2.1 
that a value is standard for two-person games whenever the value satisfies RISE and SYM. 
We conclude this section with some notation and definitions. Let (N, v) and (N, w) be 
two games with the same player set. Then we write (N, v) = (N, w), whenever v(S) = 
w(S) for all S c N. Further, for any S c N and any i E N, we usually write SC, S U i, 
and S- i, respectively, instead of N- S, S U { i }, and S - i }. Finally, for any i, j E 
N, i # j, we denote the set of coalitions containing player i but not player j, by FIJ. 
That is, 
F1J:= {Sl ScN,iA S,jT S}. 
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3. On the functional equations determining the Shapley value. Since the introduction 
of the Shapley value in Shapley [24], several axiomatic characterizations of this value 
have been given, e.g., in [3 ], [7 ], [10], [24], and [31 ]. The axiomatization of the Shapley 
value 0 on the class GN of games with a fixed player set N (e.g., in [3]) makes use of 
four properties: the Pareto-optimality, the so-called dummy player property, the symmetry 
(the equal treatment property, respectively), and the additivity property, i.e., 
4(N, v + w) = 4(N, v) + ?(N, w) for all games (N, v) and (N, w). 
Here the game (N, v + w) is given by (v + w)(S) := v(S) + w(S) for all S c N. 
We recall that the additivity axiom is the most essential one in the above charac- 
terization of the Shapley value on GN since the first hree axioms are required to be 
satisfied in order to determine the value on the so-called unanimity games which form 
an additive basis for the linear space GN (see [ 24 ] ). However, the additivity axiom is no 
longer useful for characterizing the Shapley value on the class G of all games. 
First, we pay attention to the axiomatization of the Shapley value on G with the 
aid of a consistency property in terms of the reduced games as defined in Hart and Mas- 
Colell [ 13 ]. They consider a type of reduced games dealing with the so-called subgames 
of a fixed game. Given any game (N, v) and any coalition T c N, the subgame (T, v) 
of (N, v) on T is obtained by restricting the characteristic function v to subsets of T only, 
i.e., to 2T 
Given any value a on G, any game (N, v) with INI ' 2 and any player i E N, the 
corresponding reduced game (N - { i }, v D) with respect to the value a is as follows: for 
allSc:N- {i} 
(3.1) v-(S):= v(SU { i})-1i(SU {i} , V). 
Note that the player set of the reduced game is obtained here by removing only one 
player of the original player set. Furthermore, the worth of any coalition in the above 
reduced game is equal to the original worth of the coalition together with the single player 
minus the payoff to the single player, according to the value in the subgame with the 
coalition together with the single player as player set. The reduced game property requires 
that the value yields the same payoffs to the players in the reduced game in comparison 
with the original game, i.e., 
oj(N-{i},v')=oj(N,v) foralljEN-{i}. 
THEOREM 3.1 (Hart and Mas-Colell [ 13 ]). The Shapley value 0 on G is the unique 
value on G which possesses RISE, ETP, and RGP with respect to the reduced game 
of(3.1). 
Second, we mention another type of reduced games considered by Sobolev [ 27 ] in 
order to axiomatize the Shapley value on G. 
Given any game (N, v) with I NI _ 2, any player i E N, and any payoff vector x E 
RN, the corresponding reduced game (N - { i }, vX) with respect to x is as follows: for 
allSc(N- {i} 
(3.2) vx(S):= ( INJ-1 )I I SI [v(SU { i} )-x] + ( INI -1 )( INI -I SI -1 )v(S). 
Note that the worth of any coalition in the above reduced game is obtained as a 
convex combination of the worth of the coalition in the original game and the original 
worth of the coalition together with the single player minus the payoff xl to the single 
player i for his participation. 
THEOREM 3.2 (Sobolev [27]). The Shapley value 0 on G is the unique value on G 
which possesses RISE, SYM, and RGP with respect o the reduced game of(3.2). 
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Next, we list a third type of reduced games in order to state a third and last consistency 
property for the Shapley value. This type of reduced games is derived from the alternative 
formula (2.3) for the Shapley value. 
Given any game (N, v) with I NI _ 2, any player i E N, and any payoff vector x E 
[RN, the corresponding reduced game (N - { i }, vx) with respect to x is as follows: 
vX(0):= 0, vx(N-{i}):=v(N)-xi, forallotherSScN-{i}, 
(3.3) vx(S):=(INI-l)'(INI-I S-1 )[v(S)-v(N-S)]-(INI-1)-'ISlxl. 
THEOREM 3.3 (Driessen). The Shapley value 0 on G possesses the RGP with respect 
to the reduced game of (3.3). 
We conclude this section by proving the existence part of Theorem 3.2 as well as 
the uniqueness part of Theorems 3.1, 3.2. For a proof of the existence part of Theorem 
3.1 (i.e., the proof of the RGP of the Shapley value with respect to the reduced game of 
(3. 1 )), we refer to Hart and Mas-Colell [ 13 ]. Our purpose is to prove the uniqueness 
parts of Theorems 3.1, 3.2 (as well as the forthcoming Theorem 4.2) by means of one 
specified argumentation. In other words, the uniqueness proofs are highlighted by placing 
the proofs in the context of a single line of argument. 
Proof of the existence part of Theorem 3.2. It is well known that the Shapley value 
0 on G possesses SYM and RISE. Thus, it remains to prove RGP for 0 with respect to 
the reduced game of (3.2). 
Let (N, v) be a game, i E N, j E N- i, x = 4(N, v), and let (N- i, vx) be the 
corresponding reduced game of (3.2). We must show that 4j(N - i, vx) = 41(N, v). 
Put n := INI. It follows from (2.3) that 
(3.4) 41(N,v)- , 'YN(S)[V(S )-v(S)] = 4j(N,v)- E 'YN(S)[V(S) )v(S)]. 
SErj, SErY 
By (2.3) and (3.2), we also have 
(3.5) 4j(N-i,vX)= , 'YN-i(S)[vx((N-i)-S)-vx(S)] 
Sc {ji,j}C 
(3.6) = (n - 1 )-' I SI YN-i(S)[V((SU i)C) V(SU i)] 
SC {i,j}C 
(3.7) +(n-1)-1 E: (n-1S-1I)'YN-I(S)[V(SC)-V(S)] 
Sc {I,J}C 
(3.8) +(n-l)-<'x, E (2ISI-n+?1)YNI(S). 
SC { ji,j}C 
Note that (3.8) is equivalent to 
(n-I )lxi ,Z( ~ )(2s-n+ 1 )[(n- 1)!]f's!(n-s-2)! 
(3.9) =0 s 
n-2 
=(n-1I) -2 XI, ~(2S-n +1)-(n- I)-'xi. 
s = o 
Furthermore, (3.7) is equivalent to 
(3.10) n(n- I)-' E YN(S)[V(Sc)-V(S)S, 
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while (3.6) is equivalent to 
(n- )-' E (I TI - i)YN- i(T- i)[v(TC)-v(T)] 
Te , 
= n(n-1 )-l E: z T)[( Tc)-v( T)] 
T Er r, 
-(n-)1 E' : 'YN-j(T-i)[v(TC)-v(T)] 
T E r, 
(2.3) = n(n-1)-1 [XJ- E YN( T)[v( TC)-v( T)]] 
T c I i,j I C 
-(n-1)-' ' YN_j(T-i)[v(Tc)-v(T)] 
Te , 
(3.4) =xj+(n- )-'xl+(n-1)-' E [N( T)-YN-j(T-i)][v(Tc)-v(T)] 
Te , 
-(n-1 )-' E: N( T)[v( Tc)-v( T)] 
Te , 
Tc {j,j}C 
(3.11) =xJ+(n-1)-1xj-n(n-1)-l E YN(T)[v(Tc)-v(T)], 
Tc {i,j}C 
where the last equality follows from -YN(T) - 'YN-(T- i) = -'YN(Tc) for any TE Frl 
and by noting that T E IFJ if and only if TC E Fjj. 
Thus, the sum of (3.6)-(3.8) is equal to the sum of (3.9)-(3.1 1 ), which equals xJ. 
Hence, oj(N - i, vx) = xj = 4j(N, v), i.e., the Shapley value possesses the reduced game 
property with respect to the reduced game of (3.2). D 
The existence proof of Theorem 3.2 is also valid for Theorem 3.3. We need only 
consider that the equality of (3.5) to the sum of (3.6)-(3.8) holds for the reduced game 
of (3.3) instead of the reduced game of (3.2). 
General setting of the uniqueness proof of Theorems 3.1, 3.2, and 4.2. Let a and 4 
be two values on G that possess the following properties: RISE, SYM (or ETP, respec- 
tively), and RGP with respect o a specified type of reduced games. We prove by induction 
on INI that u(N, v) = 4(N, v) for any game (N, v). The case INI = 1 is trivial because 
of Pareto-optimality, while the case where I NI = 2 follows from Lemma 2.1. Thus, let 
(N, v) E G with INI _ 3 and suppose that 
o(M, w) = {(M, w) for all (M, w)EG with 1I< I MI < IN I. 
Define (N, u) E G by 
u(S):= v(S)-E j(N,v) for all ScN. 
JES 
Since both values a and 4 possess RISE, we have 
aj(N, u) = O for all jEN and 4(N, u) = 4(N, v)-u(N, v). 
To show u(N, v) = 4(N, v), it is equivalent to show that 
(3.12) I'1(N, u)= O for all jEN. 
This content downloaded from 130.89.45.231 on Thu, 17 Dec 2015 08:41:44 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
50 THEO S. H. DRIESSEN 
Let x = u(N, v), i E N, and (N - i, VX) be the corresponding reduced game (according 
to the specified type of reduced games). 
Define (N-i, W) E G by 
w(S) := vx(S) - ?: j(N, v) for all SC-N- i. 
JES 
Let y = u(N, u). Then yJ = 0 for all j E N. Now we assert that the two operations of 
game reduction and zero-normalization with respect to the value a give rise to a com- 
mutative diagram. To be exact, the first assertion is that 
(3.13) (N-i, w) = (N-i, uY). 
Then we deduce for all j E N -i 
4ij(N- i, uy) = 4j(N- i, w) = 4j(N- i, VX) - j(N, v) 
= oj(N- i, vx) - oj(N, v) = uj(N, v) - oj(N, v) = 0, 
where the equalities follow from (3.13), RISE of 4, the induction hypothesis, and RGP of 
a, respectively. 
The second assertion is that 4j(N - i, uy) = 0 for all i E N and for all j E N -i 
implies (3.12). This completes the inductive proof of uniqueness. O 
Proof of the uniqueness part of Theorem 3.1. Consider the above general setting 
where 4 := 0 and the reduced games (N - i, VX) := (N - i, v') and (N - i, uY) 
(N - i, uu) are given by (3.1 ). First, we prove (3.13). 
Indeed, for any S c N - i we have by RISE of a that oi(S U i, u) = a,(S U i, v) - 
a, (N, v) and hence, 
ua( S) = u(SU i)-au(SU i, u) = v(SU i)- E oj(N, v)-au(SU i, v)? +j(N, v) 
JESU I 
= v(SU i)- : uj(N, v)- u1(SU i, v) = va(S)- uj(N, v) = w(S). 
JES jES 
Thus, (3.13) holds. 
Finally, we prove the second assertion in the general setting. By (3.1 ) and the 
induction hypothesis, we have that uu( S) = uO( S) for all S c N - i, S # N - i, while 
u( N - i) = u"( N - i) + 4i(N, u) since a,(N, u) = 0. By (2.1), this implies that for all 
jEN- i 
4j(N-i,u u) = 4j(N-i ,u') + (I NI -1 )-'4j(N, u), 
and hence, 
0 = 4j(N- i, uu) = 4j(N- i, uO) + ( NI - 1 )-'4(N, u) 
= j(N,u)+(INJ - )1-1i(N,u) 
by using the fact that the Shapley value 0 possesses RGP. Therefore, XJ(N, u) = 
-(IN I- 1)-1(N, u) for all jEN- i. From this and INI - 3, we conclude that 
4j(N, u) = 4k(N, u) for all j, k E N. Now it follows from the Pareto-optimality and 
u(N) = 0 that 4j(N, u) = 0 for all j E N. Thus, (3.12) holds. This completes the proof 
of uniqueness of Theorem 3.1. 0 
Proof of the uniqueness part of Theorem 3.2. Consider the above general setting 
where 4' : and the reduced games are given by (3.2). Put n:= NI. First, we 
prove (3.13). 
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For any S c N - i we have 
uy(S) = (n - 1 )-'I SI [ u(SU i)- yi] + (n-1 )-1 (n -I SI- 1 )u(S) 
= (n-i )-' I SI [v(SU i)-x(SU i)] + (n- I)-'(n- I SI - 1)[v(S)-x(S)] 
= (n-1) -'I SI [v(SU i)-xi] + (n-1 )-'(n-I SI-1 )v(S)-x(S) 
= vx(S)-x(S) = w(S). 
Thus, (3.13) holds. 
Finally, we prove the second assertion in the general setting. By using the alternative 
formula (2.3), we obtain that for all j E N -i 
0 = 41(N-i, uy=) = , YN- i(S)[uy((N-i)-S)-uy(S)] 
Sc {I,Jj}C 
(3.2) = (n-l )-' E 'N-i(S)[(n-I SI- )[u(Sc)-u(S)] 
s c {jIjX} c 
+ I SI [ u((SU i)C) - u(SU i)]] 
= n(n-l )-'I 'YN(S)[U(S')-U(S)] 
Sc {i,j}C 
+ (n-1 )-' E ( lTI-l )_YN- ifT-i)[u( Tc)-u( T)] 
TE IF 1 
(2.3) = n(n-1 )"kN(N, u)-(n-1)-1 , 'YN-i( T-i)[u(Tc)-u( T)]. 
Te IrJ 
Thus, 
j(N, u)= n-l E YN-1(T-i)[u(TC)-u(T)] for all i,jEN, iu*j. 
TE J'IJ 
By interchanging the players i and j, we obtain that for all i, j E N, i * j, 
qi(N, u) = n-' 'YN_j( T-j) [u( TC)-u( T)] 
Te rj, 
= n I EYN- i(S-i)[U(S)-U(SC)] =-kj(N, u). 
SE Jr 
From this and I N ? 3, we conclude that for any three players i, j, k E N we have on 
the one hand, 1i(N, u) = - j(N, u), and on the other hand, i(N, u) =- k(N, u) = 
j(N, u). It follows that kj(N, u) = 0 for all j E N. Thus, (3.12) holds. This completes 
the proof of uniqueness of Theorem 3.2. O 
It is still an open problem to (dis)prove the conjecture that the Shapley value on 
G is the unique value on G which possesses RISE, SYM, and RGP with respect to the 
reduced game of ( 3.3). For the sake of completeness, we remark that the general setting 
of the uniqueness proofs does not apply here since (3.13) fails to hold. 
4. On the functional equations determining the prekernel and the prenucleolus. Two 
well-known solutions are the kernel, introduced in Davis and Maschler [6], and the 
nucleolus, introduced in Schmeidler [23] as a one-point solution within the kernel. Closely 
related to the kernel is the prekernel, which was introduced in Maschler, Peleg, and 
Shapley [17]. The prekernel can be seen as a simplification of the kernel, while the 
prenucleolus is defined in the same way as the nucleolus, except it omits IR. In this 
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section we review the axiomatizations of both the prekernel and the prenucleolus by 
means of a consistency property. First, we recall the definition of the prekernel. 
The prekernel is based on the ideas of excess and maximum surplus. The excess of 
coalition S in a game (N, v) with respect to a payoff vector x E pN is defined to be 
(4.1) e(S, x, N, v):= v(S)-x(S), 
where e ( 0, x, N, v) = 0. The excess of S at x represents the gain (or loss, if it is negative) 
to the coalition S in the game if its members withdraw from the payoff vector x in order 
to form their own coalition. The maximum surplus of a player i E N over another player 
j E N in a game (N, v) with respect to a payoff vector x E p N iS given by 
(4.2) sij (x, N, v): =max [ v(S)- X(S) I S (-N, i ES,j S]. 
The maximum surplus of i over j at x represents the maximal amount that player i can 
gain (or the minimal amount that i can lose, if it is negative) without the cooperation 
of player j by withdrawing from the payoff vector x and forming a coalition not containing 
j, on the understanding that the other members of the coalition are satisfied with the 
amount they had according to x. Thus, the maximum surplus sja(x, N, v) can be seen 
as a measure of the power of i to threaten j in the game (N, v) with respect to the payoff 
vector x. The prekernel consists of pre-imputations for which no player is more powerful 
than another player. That is, the prekernel of a game (N, v) is defined to be 
y*(N,v):= {xEI*(N,v) I siJ(x,N,v)= sj(x,N,v) forall iIjEN,iI}j 
The following type of reduced games is due to Davis and Maschler [6] and the 
corresponding RGP proved to be of importance for the development of the theory of the 
kernel (see [ 16 ], [17 ] ). The reduced game in question is derived from the original game 
by removing several players, on the understanding that the removed players are paid 
according to the payoff vector x. The total earnings in the reduced game are equal to 
the total earnings in the original game minus the total payoff to the removed players. 
Furthermore, the worth of a proper coalition in the reduced game is obtained as the most 
profitable of several possibilities to cooperate with removed players, taking into account 
that those players are paid according to x. Note that the relevant reduced game differs 
from the foregoing reduced games by the fact that the maximum overall subsets of the 
set of the removed players appears for the first ime in the definition of a reduced game. 
Given any game (N, v), any coalition T c N, and any payoff vector x E P N, the 
corresponding reduced game (T, vX) with respect to x is as follows: 
(4.3) vx(0):=0, vx(T):=v(N)-x(N-T), forallotherSScT, 
vx(S):=max[v(SUR)-x(R) IR cN-T]. 
In case the payoff vector x is Pareto-optimal, the reduced game of (4.3) agrees with the 
reduced game as defined in Davis and Maschler [6 ]. It is known and straightforward to 
verify that for any game (N, v), any two players i, j E N, i # j, and any payoff vector 
X E 
N 
(4.4) sij (x, N, v) = sj(x, N, v) +x - x 
if i and j are substitutes in the game (N, v); 
(4.5) sJ(XT,T,vx)=sij(x,N,v) foranyTc Nwith {i,j}jcT, 
where the reduced game (T, VX) is given by (4.3). 
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By (4.4), it is obvious that the prekernel possesses ETP. Furthermore, it follows 
immediately from (4.5) that the prekernel possesses RGP with respect to the reduced 
game of (4.3). Closely related to RGP is the converse reduced game property, which 
refers to two-person reduced games. A solution a is said to possess the converse reduced 
game property (CRGP) (with respect to a specified type of reduced games) whenever 
the next condition is satisfied. 
CRGP. If (N, v) is a game and x E I* (N, v) such that xT E a( T, vX) for all T c N 
with I TI = 2, then x E u(N, v). The converse reduced game property requires that a 
pre-imputation x E G N is in the solution set o(N, v) of the original game (N, v) whenever 
its restriction XT to any pair T of players is in the solution set of the corresponding 
reduced game ( T, vX). We remark that CRGP was already used by Harsanyi [ 12 ] in his 
study on bargaining games. It is a direct consequence of (4.5) that the prekernel also 
possesses CRGP with respect to the reduced game of (4.3). Clearly, the prekernel 
has RISE, while the nonemptiness of the prekernel was already established in Maschler, 
Peleg, and Shapley [17]. Peleg [20] proved that these five properties fully characterize 
the prekernel. 
THEOREM 4.1 (Peleg [20]). The prekernel jf * on G is the unique solution on G 
that possesses NE, RISE, ETP, RGP, and CRGP with respect to the reduced game 
of(4.3). 
Proof. It remains to prove uniqueness. Let a be a solution on G which possesses 
the following five properties: NE, RISE, ETP, RGP, and CRGP. We show by induction 
on INI that u(N, v) = %**(N, v) for any game (N, v). The case INI = 1 is trivial and 
the case INI = 2 follows from Lemma 2.1. So, let (N, v) E G with NI ' 3 and suppose 
that u(M, w) =' *(M, w) for all (M, w) E G with 1 < I MI < IN . Let x E u(N, v). 
Then for any Tc Nwith ITI = 2 we have xTE a(T, vX) = *(T, vX) byRGPofa 
and the induction hypothesis. Now we conclude from CRGP of Xf * that x E 
,A * (N, v). Hence, u(N, v) c 4f * (N, v), while the inverse inclusion can be obtained 
by interchanging the solutions a and l *. Thus, o(N, v) = Xf * (N, v). This completes 
the inductive proof of uniqueness. O 
Peleg's proof of Theorem 4.1 is remarkably short and elegant in contrast o Sobolev's 
proof of his axiomatization of the prenucleolus by means of RGP with respect to the 
reduced game of (4.3). The prenucleolus is defined as follows. 
Let (N, v) be a game and write n = I NI . For any payoff vector x E pN, let H(x) be 
the 2'-tuple whose components are the excesses e(S, x, N, v), S c N, arranged in 
nonincreasing order. That is, we have 
61(x) ?x (X) whenever 1-< i?j?< 2. 
Now we order the various "complaint vectors" 0(x), x E pN, by the lexicographic order 
?L on [2f. For x, yE IN we write 
(X) <L O(Y) if there exists an integer 1 < k?< 2n such that 
0, (x) = 61 (y) for 1-< i < k and Ok(x) < k(y); 
(X) 'L O(Y) if either 6(x) = 0(y) or (x) <L O(Y). 
The prenucleolus consists of pre-imputations which minimize the complaint function 
6(x) in the lexicographic order over the nonempty convex pre-imputation set. That is, 
the prenucleolus of a game (N, v) is defined to be 
A`*(N,v):= {xEI*(N,v) I W(x)<L6(y) for all yEI*(N,v)}. 
It is well known that the prenucleolus of any game (N, v) consists of a unique point 
which is usually denoted by n *(N, v). Obviously, the prenucleolus has SYM and RISE. 
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Furthermore, inorder to characterize the prenucleolus by means of a consistency property, 
it was Sobolev [28] who introduced RGP with respect to the reduced game of (4.3). 
THEOREM 4.2 (Sobolev [28]). The prenucleolus n* on G is the unique value on G 
that possesses RISE, SYM, and RGP with respect o the reduced game of( 4.3). 
For the proof of the involved consistency property for the prenucleolus and of the 
uniqueness part of the above theorem, we refer to Sobolev [28]. However, it is also 
possible to put the proof of the uniqueness part of Theorem 4.2 in the general setting of 
the uniqueness proofs as treated in ? 3. The first assertion (3.13) in the general setting 
can easily be shown (see below), but unfortunately the second and last assertion in the 
general setting is still open to be proved. This open problem concerning the prenucleolus, 
which is interesting in itself, is stated below the proof of the assertion (3.13). 
Proof of( 3.13). Consider the general setting of the uniqueness proofs as treated in 
? 3, where 4 := n * and the reduced games (N- i, VX) and (N- i, uY) are given by (4.3). 
Since YJ = 0 for all j E N, we have 
UY(N- i) = u(N)-yi = u(N) = v(N)-x(N) = 0, 
while for any other coalition S C N -i 
uy(S) = max [u(SU i)-yy, u(S)] = max [u(SU i), u(S)] 
= max [v(SU i)-x(SU i), v(S)-x(S)] = max [v(SU i)-xl, v(S)] -x(S) 
= vx(S)-x(S) = w(S) . 
Because w(N - i) = vx(N - i) - x(N - i) = v(N) - xi- x(N - i) = v(N) - x(N) = 
0, it follows that w(S) = uy(S) for all S( N - i. Thus, (3.13) holds. O 
OPEN PROBLEM 4.3. Let (N, u) be a game with IN I ' 3 and u (N) = 0. 
For any i E N, let the game (N-{ i }, wi) be defined by 
wi(0):=O, w,(N-{i}):=0 and wi(S):=max[u(SU{i}),u(S)] 
forallotherSc N-{i}. Ifnj*(N-{i} wi) = Oforall iENandalljEN- {i},then 
nj*(N, u) = 0 for alljEN. 
Note the resemblance of the open problem to the converse reduced game property. 
In fact, the open problem states that the prenucleolus possesses CRGP, which refers to 
the (I NI -I )-person (instead of the two-person) reduced games of (4.3). 
5. On the functional equations determining the core. In view of the definition given 
in ? 1, the core of a game may be empty. A game (N, v) is called balanced if its core 
C(N, v) # 0, and it is called totally balanced if the core C(T, v) of any subgame 
(T, v) is nonempty. The classes of balanced and totally balanced games have been studied 
in many papers. A balanced game can be characterized in terms of balanced collections 
of coalitions (see [ 4 ] and [ 25]), while the class of totally balanced games is characterized 
as the class of market games [26 ] and of flow games [ 14]. In this section we review the 
axiomatic characterization of the core of balanced games as well as of the core of totally 
balanced games, due to Peleg [20], [21]. 
First, we list the superadditivity property, which requires that the algebraic sum of 
the solution sets of two games with the same player set is contained in the solution set 
of the sum of the two involved games. 
SAP. A solution a is said to possess the superadditivity property (SAP) if 
'(N,v?w)D'(N,v)?u(N,w) forallgames(N,v)and(N,w). 
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Note that for values, SAP is equivalent to the additivity property mentioned at the be- 
ginning of ? 3. Clearly, the core is both superadditive and individually rational. It is also 
straightforward to verify that the core on G possesses RGP with respect to the reduced 
game of (4.3). It turns out that these three properties together with NE fully characterize 
the core of balanced games. For the uniqueness proof we refer to Peleg [ 20 ]. 
THEOREM 5.1 (Peleg [20 ]). The core C is the unique solution on the class of balanced 
games which possesses NE, IR, SAP, and RGP with respect o the reduced game of( 4.3). 
The reduced game of (4.3) corresponding to a (totally) balanced game is itself also 
balanced, but it may fail to be totally balanced. Hence, the restriction of the core to the 
class of totally balanced games does not possess RGP on this class. However, for games 
with at most two players total balancedness is equivalent to balancedness. Therefore, the 
core on the class of totally balanced games still possesses the weak reduced game property, 
which refers to one- or two-person reduced games. A solution a on a class W of games 
is said to possess the weak reduced game property (WRGP) (with respect to a specified 
type of reduced games) whenever the next condition is satisfied: 
WRGP. If (N, v) E , TcN 1?I N TI? 2 and x E (N, v), then ( T, vx) E W and 
XTE o(T, vX). 
The following theorem provides an axiomatic characterization of the core of totally 
balanced games by means of WRGP and CRGP. 
THEOREM 5.2 (Peleg [21]). The core C is the unique solution on the class of totally 
balanced games which possesses NE, IR, SAP, WRGP, CRGP with respect o the reduced 
game of (4.3 ) (where all properties are restricted to the class of totally balanced games). 
Proof We already noted that the core on the class of totally balanced games 
possesses NE, IR, SAP, and WRGP. Finally, we establish that the core on G 
possesses CRGP. 
Let (N, v) be any game and xE I*(N, v) such that XTE C(T, vX) for any T c N 
with I TI = 2. We must show that x(S) > v(S) for Sc N, S 0, N. Choose iE S, jE 
N- S, and let T = { i,j}. Now XTE C( T, vX) implies xl > v x i } ), while the definition 
of vx( { i}) in the reduced game (T, vX) yields vX({ i} ) > v(S) - x(S - { i} ). It follows 
that x, _ v(S) - x(S - { i }) and hence, x(S) > v(S). So, x E C(N, v) and CRGP holds 
for the core on G. For the proof of uniqueness we refer to [21] . The uniqueness proof 
of the solution for games with at least three players resembles the uniqueness proof of 
Theorem 4.1. O 
Peleg [21] also proved that in Theorem 5.2, NE and SAP can be replaced by the 
strong requirement for a solution a that for any balanced two-person game (N, v) 
T(N, v) =xEpN E xj = v(N) and xi }_ v({ i }) for all iENh 
JEN 
This requirement for the solution a simply states that the solution coincides with the 
core for two-person games. In [ 18 ], a geometric haracterization of the intersection of 
the prekernel with the core is presented. In view of Theorems 4.1 and 5.2, the intersection 
of the prekemel with the core satisfies RISE, IR, ETP, WRGP (of totally balanced games), 
and CRGP with respect o the reduced game of( 4.3). Together with NE, these five prop- 
erties fully characterize the intersection of the prekernel with the core on the class of 
totally balanced games (see [ 21 ] ). 
6. An example and an application. The final section is devoted to an example that 
illustrates the theory of ?? 3 and 4, and also to an application of the reduced game 
property to the bankruptcy problem as presented in Aumann and Maschler [2]. 
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6.1. Example. Let the three-person game (N, v) be defined by N = { 1, 2, 3 } and 
v({i}) = 0 for all i E N, v({1, 2}) = 90, v({1, 3}) = v({2, 3}) = -30, and v(N) = 
60. The above game is strategically equivalent to the game corresponding to [18, Fig. 
5, p. 318]. 
Let x = (xI, x2, x3) E RN and a any value which is standard for two-person games. 
Thus, o-( { ij}, v) = v({i, j}) for all i,jEN, i #j. 
The corresponding two-person reduced games of (3.1)-(3.3) and (4.3), respectively, 
are listed in columns 2-4, 5-7, 8- 10, and 11- 13 of Table 1, while the payoff vectors for 
the corresponding two-person reduced games according to the value a are listed in rows 
9-1 1. For notational reasons, we write a, instead of max [0, a], where a E P. Thus, a, 
= a if a 0 and a, = 0 if a `- 0. 
The Shapley value 4(N, v) of the original game (N, v) can now be determined by 
solving the functional equations in terms of the reduced games of (3.1), (3.2), or (3.3). 
That is, by solving the following system of linear equations: 
xlv=30-24x3, x1=60-2x2, x2=60-2X1, 
x2 = 30-2x3, X3 2 x2, X3 2 . 
The unique solution of this system is x = (40, 40, -20). Hence, the Shapley value 
O(N, v) = (40, 40, -20); of course, this payoff vector can also be calculated by applying 
formula (2.1) or (2.3). 
The prenucleolus n * (N, v) can be obtained by solving the functional equations in 
terms of the reduced games of (4.3), i.e., by solving the following system of equations: 
(1) xl = 30- 2x3, (3) xI=30-2x2+2(90-x2)+ -2(-30-X2)+, 
(2) x2=30-2x3, (4) x3=30-2x2+?(-30-x2)+-2(90-X2)+, 
and 
(5) x2=30-2x1+2(90-xl)+ --(-30-xl)+, 
(6) X3 = 30 -2X1 + 2 (-30-xl)+-2 (90-xl)+. 
Since xl = x2 by (1) and (2), it follows from (3) that 
3x2-60 = (90-x2)+ -(-30-x2)+. 
Hence, X2 = 75/2 and the unique solution ofthe above system isx = (75/2, 75/2, -15). 
Thus, the prenucleolus n * (N, v) = ( 75 /2, 75 /2, -15). Since X n* = * for two-person 
games, we have by RGP of --* that J$- *(N, v) = {n*(N, v)}. 
Because n * (N, v) 7 O(N, v), it follows that the Shapley value (prenucleolus, re- 
spectively) does not possess RGP with respect to the reduced game of (4.3) ((3.1), 
(3.2), or (3.3)). Note that both the Shapley value and the prenucleolus are not in- 
dividually rational. For the sake of completeness, we recall that the kernel -*((N, v) = 
{n(N, v)} = {(30, 30, 0)} (see [18, p. 317]). 
6.2. Application. A bankruptcy problem is defined as a pair (E; dl, d2, ... , dn 
where E represents the estate of a man who died, leaving debts dl, d2, - - *, dn to n 
creditors. It is supposed that the debts are arranged in nondecreasing order (i.e., 0 - 
d`-? d2_- * * * - dn) and that the total debt is at least the estate (i.e., 0 - E -< d + 
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TABLE 2 
The relationship between solutions and properties. Here + (-, respectively) denotes the 
(in) validity of the property for the solution. Recall that in general the prenucleolus is a proper 
subset of the prekernel. 
Solution 
Prenucleolus Prekernel 
Property Shapley Value b .'ii 
RGP (3.1), (3.2), or (3.3) (4.3) (4.3) 
NE + + + 
RISE + + + 
ETP + + + 
SYM + + 
CRGP (4.3) _ - + 
IR 
d2 + * + dn). The bankruptcy game (N, v) corresponding to the bankruptcy problem 
(E; di, d2, X dn) is then defined as follows: 
N:= { 1, 2, * * *, n } as the set of n creditors, 
v(S):=max[O,E- E d.] forallScN 
jcN-S 
as the amount which the coalition S can get without going to court, i.e., the nonnegative 
amount which is left of the estate E after each member j of the complement N - S is 
paid his complete debt dj. With the aid of RGP of the prekernel with respect to the 
reduced game of (4.3), it is established by Aumann and Maschler [ 2] that the nucleolus 
of the corresponding bankruptcy game is the unique "consistent" solution of the bank- 
ruptcy problem. 
Finally, we remark that an extensive game theoretic analysis of the bankruptcy 
problem is presented in [ 9, Chap. VI]. The analysis elucidates the relationships between 
specific division rules for the bankruptcy problem and the game theoretic notions of the 
Shapley value, the nucleolus and the so-called T-value. Moreover, axiomatic character- 
izations of the T-value for the bankruptcy problem are treated in [ 5 ] and [ 9 ]. 
A consistency property for division rules in the context of the taxation problem has 
been considered in [ 32 ]. Further literature dealing with consistency, reduced games, and 
axiomatizations of solutions can be found in [ 8], [15], [19 ], and [ 29 ]. 
In summary, we list the results of Theorems 3.1-3.3 and 4.1, 4.2 in Table 2. 
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